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Unraveling the Veil:
The Concepts of Limited Liability and Disregard of the Corporate Entity
I. Limited Liability:
The limited liability of the corporate shareholder is a traditional cornerstone in
American corporate law.1 It has been the prevailing rule for corporations in the United
States for more than a century.2 Limited liability restricts the liability of a company’s
owners for nothing more than the capital they have invested in the business.3 This is one
of the main reasons people form corporations. An adequately formed corporation will
normally prevent the shareholders from being personally liable for the corporation’s
debts. The shareholders’ liability is usually limited to the amount that they have invested.
Thus, if the corporation falls into debt after the shareholders have made their initial
capital contribution, the shareholders are not typically responsible for those debts.4
There are many advantages of allowing limited liability in the corporate setting.
Limited liability encourages capital formation by the pooling of assets from numerous
investors.5 This is necessary to finance enterprises which a single investor may find too
risky or may lack adequate capitalization. Limited liability also encourages corporate
entities to take risks that they might otherwise avoid.6 Risk is necessary for growth, and
investors are more likely to take risks when their personal assets are not subjected to the
probability of the business enterprise’s success.7 Furthermore, since limited liability
allows investors to invest with more assurance in ventures where they have no executive
involvement, they can considerably expand their number of investments and thus attain

more extensive diversification in their portfolios.8 This is important for investors because
diversification is recognized as an efficient pattern for investments.9
Scholars have heavily debated the concept of limited liability.10 While most favor
limited liability, many scholars argue that limited liability creates an incentive for
corporations to manipulate the law and engage in unduly risky activities.11 For instance, a
large corporation may create many separate subsidiary corporations to minimize its
exposure to liability. This is in fact what most large corporations do to enable insulation
for the parent company for liability for the obligations of its various subsidiaries.12 For
example, the Mobil Oil Corporation operates in over 60 countries through 525
subsidiaries.13 While this is legal, many argue that a system of pro rata shareholder
liability may be a rational approach.14 This system would hold each shareholder liable for
damages according to their respective ownership in the corporation. However, other
scholars have pointed out that any pro rata shareholder liability system may fail because
it would be virtually impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
shareholders who have insufficient contacts with the forum state apart from their shares
in the liable corporation.15
In any event, the majority of scholars and politicians believe that any propositions
of unlimited liability are simply impracticable. Most corporations and small businesses in
the United States rely on limited liability in order to operate.16 Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently endorsed the common law rule of limited liability in U.S. v.
Bestfoods.17 This dispels any discussion of limited liability being proved unwarranted in
the federal courts.18 In any case, the eradication of limited liability would necessitate
legislative action; action that any politician would most likely not want to pursue as it
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would appear “anti-small business.”19 According to Professor David Leebron of
Columbia University, “[n]o principle seems more established in capitalist law, or more
essential to the functioning of the modern corporate economy” than limited liability.20
In summary, limited liability shields the personal assets of corporate shareholders
from the claims of corporate creditors. A shareholder’s liability is restricted to the capital
which the shareholder has invested in the corporation.21 Since a corporation is a legal
entity separate from its shareholders, it is solely liable for its debts.22 However, the courts
will disregard the corporate entity and “pierce the corporate veil” when the corporation
has been used in a fraudulent manner to deceive creditors or others dealing with them.23
II. Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Despite the advantages of limited liability in the corporate setting, it also means
that creditors of failed corporations are not going to be paid what the corporation may
owe them. The likely response of the unpaid creditors is to attempt to sue the
shareholders of the failed corporation. The unpaid creditors will argue that due to abuse
of the corporate form by persons in control of the corporation, limited liability should not
be upheld. The unpaid creditors will argue that the court should extend liability beyond
the corporate entity, or, “pierce the corporate veil.”24 The veil is pierced, so to speak, if
the court imposes liability upon the shareholders for the corporation’s debt to the
creditor.25 This is done when a court determines that the debt in question is not really a
debt of the corporation but in fairness should be viewed as a debt of the individual or the
shareholder.26 This is not done without due consideration. The court’s decision depends
on the facts of each case. Typically, the party seeking to pierce the veil must show that an
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individual controlled or used the business so as to evade a personal obligation, perpetrate
a fraud or a crime, gain an unfair advantage, or commit an injustice.27
The law surrounding the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is somewhat
complex and confusing.28 The facts of each case are important and wide variation exists
from case to case.29 The doctrine has been given many labels including the “alter ego”
theory, the “instrumentality” theory, and the “corporate disregard” theory.30 Moreover,
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is used to explain a variety of different
problems.31 Not only does the doctrine concern when the limited liability of the corporate
entity should be disregarded, but it is also used in situations where a corporate
shareholder may want to pierce the veil of his own corporation and sometimes in reverse
to allow someone to reach the assets of the corporation to satisfy a claim or judgment
against a corporate insider or a shareholder.32
Furthermore, there are many doctrinal offshoots such as the “enterprise liability”
theory, holding a group of corporations under common control as one enterprise for
liability purposes, and “equitable subordination,” holding the claims of shareholders
subordinate in favor of outside creditors.33 However confusing and complex the doctrine
and its offshoots may be, it is invoked quite frequently.34 In fact, according to Professor
Robert Thompson of Washington University, “[p]iercing the corporate veil is the most
litigated issue in corporate law…”35 Although Professor Thompson concedes later in that
same sentence that the issue “remains among the least understood.”36 Even Judge
Cardozo declared in Berkley v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. that the entire doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil is “enveloped in the mists of metaphor.”37
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Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy which must be examined on an
ad hoc basis.38 The court’s analysis is highly dependent on the facts of each case.39
Courts usually consider a variety of factors in determining whether to pierce the veil.40
Traditionally, courts have been more likely to pierce the corporate veil when there has
been a presence of two or more of the following factors: (1) the failure to maintain
adequate corporate records or to comply with corporate formalities; (2) the corporation’s
initial financing was not reasonably adequate, i.e., undercapitalization; (3) the
commingling of funds or assets; (4) one corporation treating the assets of another
corporation as its own; or (5) the corporation was formed to evade existing obligations or
otherwise to cheat or defraud creditors.41 In other words, when “corporate formalities are
substantially observed, initial financing reasonably adequate, and the corporation was not
formed to evade an existing obligation or a statute or to cheat or to defraud, even a
controlling shareholder enjoys limited liability.”42 Furthermore, before a court will
disregard the corporate fiction and impose personal liability on the shareholders for the
obligations of the corporation, there must be an abuse of the corporate form to evade the
corporate obligation such that adherence to the concept of limited liability would sanction
a fraud or promote an injustice.43
According to Professor Stephen B. Presser of Northwestern University, perhaps
the most commonly quoted general rule of piercing the corporate veil is stated by Judge
Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.44:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until
sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
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Accordingly, Professor Robert Clark, the former Dean of Harvard Law School, suggests
that the basic legal rule of piercing the corporate veil is rather straight-forward45:
The corporate veil will be pierced, and the shareholders and/or the controlling
parties will be subjected to personal liability for the debts of the corporation,
when the corporation has served as the instrumentality or alter ego of shareholders
or controlling parties.
Professor Clark asserts that while the basic rule is rather undemanding, the complications
come in its application.46 Clark admits that while this basic rule may be helpful in an
academic setting, it is not particularly useful to practitioners who need to focus more on
the individual facts involved in each case.47 Of course, Professor Presser points out that
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an ever-changing doctrine that is “never
likely to be pinned down to rigid particulars, and that it will evolve and change as long as
our conception of, and ours goals for, the corporation remain changing.”48
An important thing to note before invoking the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil is that a plaintiff must first establish an independent basis to hold the corporation
liable.49 The plaintiff must prove that the corporation is liable for a tort or breach of
contract.50 If the corporation has insufficient assets to cover the judgment, the plaintiff
may then attempt to disregard the corporate entity and pierce through the veil that
protects the shareholders from liability.51 This is important because without an
independent basis to hold the corporation liable, the issue of piercing the corporate veil
will never emerge.
Furthermore, it is important to consider what the substance of the claim is.
According to a study of over 1600 veil piercing cases by Professor Robert Thompson,
courts upheld piercing the corporate veil in about 40% of contract cases and in about 30%
of tort cases.52 This goes to show that not only have courts “been reluctant to pierce the
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corporate veil,”53 but the success of any suit is correlated to the underlying substance of
the claim.54 While some commentators suggest that courts are more willing to pierce the
corporate veil and extend liability to shareholders when a tort has been committed,55
Professor Thompson’s study shows us that this is not always necessarily true.56
Thompson argues that the most troublesome problems in the area of veil piercing are
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentation.57 While Thompson does concur that courts
will frequently pierce the corporate veil for undercapitalization of the corporate entity in
tort, he explains that these represent only a small portion of veil-piercing cases.58 In
summary, Thompson argues that contract claims are more frequent than tort claims, and
while courts may in certain circumstances be more willing to pierce the corporate veil
when a tort has been committed, every claim depends on the specific facts.59
III. Factors to Consider in Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Many courts vary in their willingness to pierce the corporate veil.60 Even in courts
that are willing to do so, this is considered an extreme remedy.61 Courts have usually
been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil when three elements are satisfied: (i) corporate
formalities are substantially observed; (ii) the corporation’s initial financing was
reasonably adequate; and (iii) the corporation was not formed to evade existing
obligations or otherwise defraud creditors.62 However, there are no definite rules to
determine when the corporate veil will be pierced.63 Courts must instead contemplate a
number of factors in determining whether to pierce the veil. There is no definitive list of
factors which a court will consider. As a general rule, courts usually require at least two
factors be present before the corporate veil will be pierced.64 Additionally, many courts
require that an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness be present before they will
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pierce the corporate veil.65 According to many scholars and courts, the most common
grouping is usually inadequate capitalization along with failure to follow corporate
formalities.66 Discussed below are the most prominent factors a court will consider.
a. Inadequate Capitalization:
Perhaps the single most important factor which most courts consider in whether to
pierce the corporate veil is whether the corporation has been inadequately capitalized.67
The incorporators and directors of a corporation have an obligation to provide adequate
capitalization upon incorporation.68 Inadequate capitalization is measured at the time of
formation and is a continuing obligation from then on during the corporation’s
operations.69 Inadequate capitalization or “undercapitalization” has been identified as a
ground to pierce the corporate veil “[i]f the capital be trifling or illusory compared with
the business to be done or the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity
privilege.”70 This places a requirement on incorporators and directors to fund the
corporation with an adequate amount of capital upon incorporation for a transitional
period of time.71 However, it is important to keep in mind that corporate liability must be
determined before any question relating to shareholder liability from inadequate
capitalization will be considered.72
Professor Presser has determined that the basic concept behind theory of
inadequate capitalization “is that if the shareholder or shareholders deliberately
incorporate with initial capital they know to be inadequate to meet the expected liabilities
of the business they intend to be doing, they are engaging in an abuse of the corporate
form, and ought to be individually liable when those liabilities actually occur.”73 Thus,
incorporators and directors must consider many factors in determining how much capital
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should be placed in the corporation upon incorporation. They must consider things such
as what type of corporation they are creating, how long the transitional period of time
will be until the corporation should become profitable, and how much funding the
corporation will require to be considered adequate.74
Since a corporation must be initially adequately capitalized to avoid veil piercing,
it is important to consider what “capital” actually is for these purposes. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “capital” as “money or assets invested, or available for investments, in
a business.”75 Capital has also been defined as equity which is permanently contributed to
the corporation and subject to control by the corporation’s board of directors.76 Other
scholars consider capital to include everything a corporation owns which is available to
satisfy their liabilities.77 Moreover, some courts have held that liability insurance
coverage, purchased by corporations to cover possible liabilities, may be considered to be
the capital of the business.78 Therefore, it is important to remember that not only the
initial money and/or assets invested into a corporation may be considered “capital,” but a
court must also consider other contributions such as liability insurance coverage, loans,
and other equity which a corporation may attain.79
Furthermore, it is important to consider when capital will be deemed adequate.
According to Professors Pinto and Branson,80 there is very little authority on what
constitutes inadequate capitalization.81 Most courts usually cite to Professor Ballantine’s
well-known “trifling or illusory” epigram in comparing the capital to the type of
corporation involved.82 If the amount of capital is “trifling or illusory” in comparison
with the type of corporation involved, it is usually ruled to be inadequate. According to
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Pinto and Branson, courts apply a “know it when they see it” standard, or let the jury
decide whether the capital was adequate.83
A common issue of debate is whether inadequacy of capital alone is a sufficient
ground to pierce the corporate veil. Some scholars point out that older statutes placed a
requirement upon corporations to provide a certain amount of capital actually paid in
prior to commencing business.84 However, current corporate statutes allow persons to
incorporate with minimum capital or without capital at all. Thus, once the corporation’s
articles of incorporation have been accepted by the Secretary of the State, the corporation
is provided with limited liability, regardless of whether any capital has been paid in.85
Therefore, some scholars argue that courts should not be able to circumvent the desires of
the legislature and disregard limited liability by requiring some form of minimum capital
if the corporate statutes do not require it.86 The courts are split on this issue.
The minority view holds that the corporate veil may be pierced if there has been
grossly inadequate capitalization of a corporation.87 The best-known case representing
this view is Minton v. Cavaney.88 In Minton, a young girl drowned in a swimming pool
owned by the Seminole Hot Springs Corporation (Seminole). The Mintons, the young
girl’s parents, sued Seminole and received a judgment against them which remained
unsatisfied. The Mintons then sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Cavaney, the
director, secretary, treasurer, and majority owner of Seminole stock, personally liable for
the judgment against Seminole. Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
identified three alternative grounds for piercing the corporate veil holding that “[t]he
equitable owners of a corporation…are personally liable when they treat the assets of the
corporation as their own and add or withdraw capital from the corporation at will; when
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they hold themselves out as being personally liable for the debts of the corporation; or
when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of
corporate affairs.”89 However, the Court only focused on the issue of undercapitalization
in this case. The Court found that there “was no attempt to provide adequate
capitalization” in this case since “Seminole never had any substantial assets,” they
“leased the pool that [they] operated,” and they “forfeited [the lease] for failure to pay the
rent.”90 The Court held that this was reason enough to pierce the corporate veil and hold
Cavaney liable for the judgment against Seminole. However, it should be noted that this
is one of the very few sources of authority for this point of view and that “inadequate
capitalization per se [may no longer] trigger veil piercing in California.”91
Nevertheless, most courts and scholars agree that undercapitalization alone should
not be enough to trigger veil piercing.92 While the Minton case and some dicta from other
cases seem to maintain the idea that grossly inadequate capitalization alone will support
veil piercing, the consensus from the majority of scholars is that you need
undercapitalization plus some other factor/s present to pierce the veil.93 Typically, most
courts require that there be either some affirmative fraud or wrongdoing by the
shareholder, or failure to follow the formalities of corporate existence before the
corporate veil will be pierced.94 According to Professor Berle, the typical case of piercing
the veil for undercapitalization occurs where a “central corporation owns a controlling
interest in one or more other corporations, but has so handled them that they have ceased
to represent a separate enterprise and have become, as a business matter, more or less
indistinguishable parts of a larger enterprise.”95 Berle proposes that the typical case
involves undercapitalization plus another factor, which is most commonly the

11

intermingling of business affairs.96 Berle suggests that undercapitalization alone is
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil and something more is needed.97
Perhaps the most well-known case representing the majority view that grossly
inadequate capitalization is only a factor in determining whether to pierce the corporate
veil is Walkovszky v. Carlton.98 In Walkovszky, John Walkovszky was injured when he
was hit by a cab owned by the Seon Cab Corporation (Seon). Seon was owned by
William Carlton, who also owned ten other cab corporations. Seon and the ten other cab
corporations each had only two cabs registered in their name and the cabs carried only
the minimum liability insurance required by law of $10,000. Walkovszky alleged that the
corporations “operated as a single entity…with regard to financing, supplies, repairs,
employees, and garaging.” Walkovszky thus sought to hold Carlton personally liable for
his injuries “because the multiple corporate structure constitute[d] an unlawful attempt to
defraud members of the general public who might be injured by the cabs.” The court
acknowledged the fact that the “corporations were intentionally undercapitalized for the
purpose of avoiding responsibility for acts which were bound to arise as a result of the
operation of a large taxi fleet having cars out on the street 24 hours a day and engaged in
public transportation.”99 However, the court held that this was the very purpose of
allowing limited liability for those engaged in this type of business. The court held that
the corporate entity may not be disregarded simply because of the fact that “the assets of
the corporation, together with the mandatory insurance coverage of the vehicle…are
insufficient to assure [Walkovszky] the recovery [he] sought.”100 The court further held
that it is up to the legislature to determine the amount of minimum liability insurance
required by law. Thus, unless Walkovszky could show that Carlton conducted the
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business in his individual capacity or used some type of fraud, the court found that
Walkovszky could not recover. It is worth mentioning, however, that Walkovszky
eventually won his case when he filed an amended complaint alleging that not only were
the corporations undercapitalized, but Carlton intentionally undercapitalized the
corporations in the way they were organized and insured, and by siphoning profits from
the companies.101
Another key case supporting the view that undercapitalization alone is not enough
to pierce the corporate veil is Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.102 In Fletcher, Marianne Fletcher sued
Atex, Inc. (Atex) and its parent corporation, Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak), for
damages from repetitive stress injuries due to the faulty design of computer keyboards
manufactured by Atex. Fletcher sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Kodak liable
alleging Atex was intentionally left undercapitalized due to Kodak’s centralized cash
management system. Through this system Atex maintained zero balance bank accounts
and funds were only transferred from Kodak when Atex was in need. The court held that
“without considerably more,” the use of a centralized cash management system was not
enough to pierce the corporate veil.103 Thus, Fletcher was unable to pierce the corporate
veil solely for reasons of undercapitalization.
Scholars Pinto and Branson104 believe that Fletcher does damage to the veil
piercing doctrine by encouraging parent corporations to purposely leave their subsidiaries
undercapitalized and thus deprive them “of any financial independence.”105 Pinto and
Branson suggest that any centralized cash management system will encourage fraudulent
bookkeeping by allowing excessive cash flow to be “upstreamed” to the parent
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corporation while the subsidiary retains the liabilities.106 At any rate, most courts agree
that the practice is completely acceptable.107
It is important to note that courts are especially likely to pierce the corporate veil
when the incorporator has invested no capital whatsoever in the corporation.108 In these
cases a court will usually require less evidence of other factors than if the capitalization
was merely inadequate.109 The best example of this comes from the well-known Kinney
Shoe Corp. v. Polan case.110 In Kinney Shoe Corp., Kinney Shoe Corp. (Kinney) leased a
building to Industrial Realty Co. (Industrial), a corporation owned by Lincoln Polan
(Polan). Industrial had no assets, no income, no bank account, and Polan was the sole
shareholder and officer. Polan had Industrial sub-lease the building to another of his
corporations, Polan Industries, Inc. who refused to make any sub-lease payments to
Industrial. Industrial, consequently, made no lease payments to Kinney. Kinney sought to
pierce the corporate veil and hold Polan liable for the lease to Industrial. The court agreed
with Kinney holding that Industrial was “no more than a shell.” The court further held
that “[w]hen nothing is invested in the corporation, the corporation provides no
protection to its owner; nothing in, nothing out, no protection.”111
Another issue of debate is whether shareholders or a parent corporation must add
new capital as a business grows. For instance, suppose the initial capital contributed at
formation is adequate, but the business grows to the point where the initial contribution is
no longer adequate to meet the new responsibilities of the company. Many scholars argue
that this should be considered inadequate capitalization making veil-piercing more
probable. However, others argue that they must be protected as long as the capital
contributed at formation was more than “trifling or illusory.”112 An example of this
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comes from the case of Arnold v. Phillips.113 In Arnold, A. M. Arnold founded the
Southern Brewing Company (Southern), a beer brewing business, with $125,000 in initial
capital. Southern had a two year period of success, followed by a sharp decline which
required Arnold to make additional loans to Southern. The court held that the additional
funds provided to Southern did not render the initial capital contribution inadequate
because the “nature and purpose” of the business had not changed. The court further held
that this was not a case “where the corporate entity ought to be disregarded as being a
sham, a mere obstacle to justice, or an instrument of fraud.”114 However, the court
mentions that if a corporation were to change its “nature and purpose,” the adequacy of
the additional capital would have to be considered in that light.115 In these types of cases
a plaintiff may have a better chance of veil-piercing if the corporation’s success is
dwindling rather than succeeding. After all, an argument that a stockholder’s failure to
replenish the capital of a failing corporation is very similar to that of inadequate initial
capitalization. However, few courts would probably accept this argument. According to
Professor Clark, “there is no affirmative duty on [shareholders’] part to supply an
additional investment to a dying corporation. Such a duty would be in fundamental
contradiction to the policy of permitting limited liability.”116
b. Lack of Corporate Formalities:
Lack of corporate formalities is another important factor a court will consider in
determining whether or not they will pierce the corporate veil.117 If a corporation has
failed to follow corporate formalities in the running of the business, a court is more likely
to pierce the veil.118 The failure to follow corporate formalities can be achieved in a
number of ways. For instance, a corporation has failed to follow corporate formalities
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when shareholders’ meetings and directors’ meetings are not held; corporate financial
records are not kept; shares of the corporation are never officially issued, or consideration
for them is never received by the corporation; and when shareholders do not distinguish
between personal property and corporate property.119 Courts usually determine that a lack
of corporate formalities indicates an impermissible intermixture of affairs or the use of a
corporation as a “mere instrumentality.”120 Furthermore, when corporate formalities are
ignored, courts usually require at least one other independent factor for piercing the
corporate veil.121
An example of a case where a court pierced the corporate veil for failure to follow
corporate formalities can be found in House of Koscot Development Corp. v. American
Line Cosmetics, Inc.122 In House of Koscot Development Corp., House of Koscot
Development Corp. (Development) and American Line entered into an agreement for
Development to sell retail cosmetic store franchises for American Line. Glenn Turner
was a director and majority shareholder of American Line. American Line subsequently
breached their contract with Development at the request of Turner. Development sought
to pierce the corporate veil and hold Turner personally liable for the breach of contract.
Development relied primarily on the theory that American Line was an instrumentality
for the business activities of Turner. Development produced a substantial amount of
evidence that Turner failed to follow normal corporate formalities by personally hiring
and firing American Line employees, making corporate decisions without consulting
officers or other directors, and converting corporate funds for Turner’s personal use.123
Development also produced considerable evidence of inadequate capitalization on the
part of Turner. The court, considering these factors of failure to follow corporate
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formalities and inadequate capitalization, ruled in favor of Development holding that
“[w]henever one uses control of a corporation to further his own, rather than the
corporation's business, he will be liable for the corporation's acts under the doctrine of
agency or under the principle of identity.”124
Another example where the court pierced the corporate veil for failure to follow
corporate formalities can be found in the frequently cited case of DeWitt Truck Brokers,
Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.125 In DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., DeWitt Truck
Brokers, Inc. (DeWitt) furnished transportation to W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. (Fruit
Co.), a corporate fruit jobber.126 Fruit Co. became unable to pay DeWitt and DeWitt
sought to pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on Flemming, the president of
Fruit Co., personally. DeWitt provided evidence that Flemming was completely dominant
over Fruit Co.’s affairs, that there were no corporate records of directors’ or stockholders’
meetings, that Flemming had issued 5,000 shares of Fruit Co. stock for consideration of
one dollar each, that no director or officer had ever been paid by Fruit Co., and that there
probably were no other active officers or directors.127 The court found that “corporate
formalities, even rudimentary formalities, were not observed by [Flemming],” and that
the corporation was operated in a “purely personal matter.”128 The court also found that
Flemming had undercapitalized Fruit Co. and thus allowed DeWitt to pierce the veil and
hold Flemming liable.
An issue of debate is whether lack of corporate formalities alone is enough to
constitute piercing the corporate veil. Most courts and scholars have held that it is not and
will require the presence of another factor/s before the veil will be pierced.129 The Model
Business Corporation Act is in accordance with this viewpoint that the failure to follow
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corporate formalities, standing alone, is not a ground for piercing the corporate veil.130
The relevant provision provides that:
The failure of a statutory close corporation to observe the usual corporate
formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its corporate powers or
management of its business and affairs is not a ground for imposing personal
liability on the shareholders for the liabilities of the corporation.131
The court in Tannahill v. Aunspach considered this issue.132 In Tannahill, Paul
Aunspach, the president and a shareholder of American Delivery Services Corporation
(American), leased cars from Rent-A-Dent for American’s delivery business. American
later sold all their assets and defaulted on the leased cars from Rent-A-Dent. Rent-A-Dent
sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Aunspach liable for the money American
owed on the leased cars. Rent-A-Dent claimed there was an “absence of corporate
references in any of the documents exchanged in the Rent-A-Dent transaction” and thus
the corporate entity should be disregarded for failure to follow corporate formalities. The
court acknowledged that “[a] corporation's failure to follow corporate formalities is
among the factors considered in making [a] determination” to pierce the corporate veil.
However, the court held that “[t]his is not a situation in which we believe the corporate
entity should be disregarded” because “[f]ailure to follow corporate formalities in the
ordinary course of business does not necessarily justify piercing the corporate veil.” The
court indicated that something more was needed to pierce the corporate veil, not just
“failure to follow corporate formalities” alone.
Another case which held that lack of corporate formalities alone is not enough to
constitute veil-piercing is Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney.133 In Scott Graphics, Inc.,
Scott Graphics, Inc. (Scott) obtained a judgment against Copy Machines, Inc. (CMI)
which CMI never satisfied. Scott subsequently sought to pierce the corporate veil and
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hold Mahaney, an officer, director, and shareholder of CMI, personally liable for the
debt. Scott provided evidence of substantial disregard of corporate formalities on the part
of Mahaney. The court agreed that there “was disregard of corporate formality in the
operation of” CMI, however, lack of corporate formalities alone is “not enough to
warrant disregarding the corporate entity.”134
The main rationale for courts in considering the lack of corporate formalities in
determining whether to pierce the veil is that the failure to follow formalities may cause
injury to corporate creditors.135 For example, if a shareholder fails to follow corporate
formalities by removing cash from the corporation to use for his own personal debts, he is
causing injury to the creditor by removing money which the creditor may have
recovered.136 Furthermore, the failure to follow corporate formalities may also injure the
creditor by misleading him. For example, a creditor may be mislead by a shareholder who
uses his personal name on business cards instead of the corporate name, and who may
pay corporate bills with personal checks, etc.137 This causes injury to the creditor because
he may now believe that he was dealing personally with the shareholder and not the
corporation. In these situations it may be easier for the creditor to prove an element of
injustice or fundamental unfairness, and that the shareholder should be personally liable
for the injury.138
However, some scholars and courts claim that it is somewhat irrational to point to
lack of corporate formalities as a reason to pierce the corporate veil since in most of the
cases the failure to follow formalities did not injure the creditors.139 For example, if the
lack of corporate formalities is in the form of failure to hold shareholders’ and directors’
meetings, this will almost never directly injure the creditor.140 For this reason, some
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courts hold that failure to follow corporate formalities is no longer a factor to consider in
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.141 Consider the case of Scott v.
McKay.142 In Scott, John McKay was the president and general manager of Willow Creek
Entertainment, Inc. (Willow). Willow owned a number of radio stations and was
experiencing financial difficulties. At the request of McKay, Lynwood Scott loaned
$100,000 to Willow. Willow then defaulted on the loan and sold all of their assets. Scott
sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold McKay liable for the loan. The only evidence
Scott could present was lack of corporate formalities on the part of Willow. The court
refused to pierce the veil holding that “failure to comply with corporate formalities is no
longer a factor in considering whether alter ego exists.”143
In any case, the majority of scholars and courts agree that “the shareholder should
not be permitted first to ignore the rules of corporate behavior and then later to claim the
advantage of the corporate shield.”144 It seems that failure to follow corporate formalities
is a persuasive factor in considering whether to pierce the corporate veil in a majority of
jurisdictions in the United States. The court in Kinney Shoe Corp. sums it up best when it
held that “[i]f a shareholder wishes the protection of a corporation to limit his liability,
then he must follow the simple formalities of maintaining the corporation.”145
c. Intermixture of Affairs:
According to Pinto and Branson,146 the term “intermixture of affairs” or
“intertwined operations” refers to “the blurring of the distinction between the concerns of
the corporation and those of the owners.”147 When the affairs of the corporation and those
of the owner/s become intertwined, it becomes difficult for an outside party to determine
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where the owner’s affairs end and where the corporation’s affairs start.148 This factor is
closely related to and often overlaps with “lack of corporate formalities.”
An example of when the business affairs of two corporations are intermixed, and
separate corporate formalities are not followed, would occur if both corporations have
exactly the same board of directors, have the same directors’ meetings, and have the same
set of minutes for their meetings.149 Evidence of any intermixture of affairs makes veilpiercing more likely. When the business operations of the owner and the corporation are
completely intertwined, a court will usually apply the “instrumentality theory” to extend
liability to the owners.150
The court in American Trading and Production Corp. v. Fischback & Moore
considered whether to pierce the corporate veil through the instrumentality theory for
intermixture of affairs.151 In American Trading and Production Corp., American Trading
and Production Corp. (American) suffered losses when a fire destroyed the exposition
hall housing their property. The fire was caused by the faulty wiring installed by a
subsidiary of Fischback & Moore (Fischback). Fischback owned more than twenty
subsidiaries which wired buildings for electricity. American sought to pierce the
corporate veil and hold Fischback liable for the shoddy work done by their subsidiary.
American invoked an instrumentality theory alleging that Fischback dominated and
controlled their subsidiary through their intermixture of business affairs. The court
refused to hold Fischback accountable holding that “[t]he corporate entity is only ignored
when the ends of justice require it.”152 The court considered the evidence of the
business’s intertwined operations and held that it was not sufficient to invoke liability
under a theory of instrumentality.153
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An example of a court which did pierce the corporate veil for intermixture of
affairs can be found in Kramer v. Keys.154 In Kramer, Jerry Kramer was killed when his
vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by J.T. Keys, an employee of Ralph Walker,
Inc. (RWI). Kramer’s wife brought suit against Keys and RWI, and sought to pierce the
corporate veil to hold Ralph Walker, owner of RWI, personally liable. Mrs. Kramer
alleged that Walker had intermingled his business affairs with RWI to such an extent that
the corporate entity was indistinguishable. The court found sufficient justification to
pierce the corporate veil finding evidence that Walker had included his personal assets
among those that were depreciated on the corporation’s tax return, Walker had executed
leases for RWI and filed other RWI reports in his own name, and had endorsed RWI
checks by signing his own name.155 In establishing liability for Walker the court held that
“courts will ignore separate corporate entities in order to defeat a fraud, wrong, or
injustice, at least where the rights of third persons are concerned.”156
Scholars point out that when business affairs are intertwined between the
corporation and the owners, an inference is usually made that the owners are more
accountable for the obligation.157 In order to avoid this assumption, the shareholder/s
must preclude from intertwining their business affairs, and clearly document their
dealings with their corporation.158 This must especially be done in “one-man
corporations” where the corporation is owned by a single person who is the sole
shareholder, director, etc.159 Lack of corporate formalities and intermixture of affairs
have proven to be “unique hazards” for one-man corporations because they are inherently
characteristic of one-man corporations.160 For example, there is no need to have one-man
shareholders’ and directors’ meetings, the sole shareholder will more than likely invest
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his personal funds to keep the corporation capitalized, the sole shareholder will also often
intermingle his funds with that of the corporation’s funds, and one-man corporations are
almost always controlled exclusively by the sole shareholder.161 These are seemingly
necessities in running a one-man corporation but will still be considered factors in
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil.162 That is why it is of key importance
that the sole shareholder keeps scrupulous records in his dealings with his corporation.
Failure to do so may give the court more reason to pierce the corporate veil.
In any case, when the owners of a corporation treat its assets as their own, and the
affairs of the corporation are intermixed with the owner’s affairs, the separate corporate
entity can no longer be observed and a court must pierce the corporate veil.163 This is
necessary to protect the corporation’s creditors.164 According to Professors Cox and
Hazen,165 “[i]f the shareholders themselves disregard the separateness of the corporation,
the courts also will disregard it so far as necessary to protect individual and corporate
creditors.”166
d. Fraud / Wrongdoing / Misrepresentation:
Another factor that courts consider in determining whether to pierce the corporate
veil is whether there has been a serious fraud or wrongdoing by the corporation’s
shareholder/s.167 Courts have defined “fraud” as “a misrepresentation or a suppression of
the truth with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a
loss or inconvenience to the other.”168 Similarly, “wrongdoing” has been defined as
“using the corporation as a device or sham to accomplish some ulterior purpose such as
fraud or some illegal purpose.”169 When a corporation has been formed for the sole
purpose of perpetrating a fraud or wrongdoing, a court may disregard the corporate
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entity.170 Courts usually focus on whether the corporation had any other reason to exist
other than to perpetrate a fraud or wrongdoing.171 In other words, a court will ask whether
the only purpose of creating the corporation was to carry out a fraud. An example of a
fraud or wrongdoing would occur if a shareholder was siphoning profits from the
corporation thus leaving the corporation unable to pay their creditors (this is considered
by some courts to be a form of inadequate capitalization), or if a corporation was formed
to evade existing obligations such as a contract or a statute.172 It is important to note that
while many scholars consider undercapitalization to be the most important factor to
consider in piercing the corporate veil,173 courts will most often pierce the corporate veil
in cases where fraud / misrepresentation is present.174
When a corporation is created for the sole purpose of perpetrating a fraud, the
court will usually pierce the corporate veil.175 This is exemplified in the case of Linn &
Lane Timber Co. v. United States.176 In Linn & Lane Timber Co., the United States
brought suit against Smith to recover lands conveyed to him under the Timber and Stone
Act of 1878. The United States claimed that Smith obtained the lands from the United
States in a fraudulent manner. Smith subsequently created a corporation to which he
conveyed the property until the statute of limitations had run. After the statute of
limitations had run, Smith re-conveyed the lands back to himself. The court held “that the
corporation was the mere tool of Smith [in] an effort to keep the title concealed until it
was too late for the United States to complain.”177 The court then awarded the lands to
the United States holding that “the difference in legal personality between Smith and the
corporation [gave] the corporation no greater rights than Smith” due to his fraudulent use
of the corporate form.178
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When a shareholder sets up a corporation with adequate initial capital, but then
siphons out all of the profits and/or capital while the company operates, the court will
consider this to be fraud or wrongdoing.179 This leaves the corporation with too little cash
to satisfy corporate creditors, thus giving courts more reason to pierce the corporate veil.
This is what happened in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source.180 In Sea-Land
Services, Inc., Sea-Land Services, Inc. (Sea-Land), an ocean carrier, shipped freight on
behalf of Pepper Source (Pepper). Pepper subsequently failed to pay Sea-Land for the
freight bill. Sea-Land sued Pepper and obtained a default judgment. However, Sea-Land
was unable to collect its judgment because Pepper had dissolved and had no assets. SeaLand then sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Gerald Marchese, the sole owner
of Pepper, liable for the judgment. After the court considered evidence that Marchese
failed to follow corporate formalities, it focused on fraud and wrongdoing. The court
found that Marchese had siphoned funds from Pepper, leaving Pepper unable to pay SeaLand, by withdrawing a salary from Pepper and frequently taking “shareholder loans”
from Pepper to pay personal expenses.181 The court concluded that Marchese deliberately
manipulated the assets of Pepper to ensure that Sea-Land would not be paid. The court
further held that the corporate veil should be pierced in order to prevent “a fraud or
promote injustice.”182
Another example of fraud or wrongdoing can be found when a corporation is
formed to evade existing obligations such as a contract or a statute.183 This was the case
in Sundaco, Inc. v. State.184 In Sundaco, Inc., the State of Texas had a law mandating that
businesses close on alternative weekends. In order to circumvent this law, the owners of
Sundaco, Inc. (Sundaco) formed another corporation named Clark’s. Clark’s would buy
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all of Sundaco’s goods, wares, and merchandise every other week in order to stay open
every day of every weekend. The City of Abilene, Texas (Texas) brought suit claiming a
violation of the statute. Texas alleged that Sundaco was the alter ego of Clark’s and was
created for the purpose of achieving weekend sales. The court held that sale and resale
transaction was a ploy created to evade the statute prohibiting a store from selling items
on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays.185 The court thus allowed Texas to disregard the
separate identity of Clark’s in bringing suit against Sundaco.
An issue of debate is whether fraud is a necessary element that is required before
a court will pierce the corporate veil.186 This varies somewhat from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but the overall consensus is that it is probably not necessary, as long as there
is some sort of injustice present.187 The court in DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. held that
“[c]ontrary to the basic contention of the defendant…proof of fraud is not a necessary
element in a finding to disregard the corporate entity.”188 The court in Trs. of the Nat'l
Elevator Indus. Pension…v. Lutyk, elaborated on this view in holding that actual fraud
was not required “as a prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil. However, where the
conduct alleged to justify piercing the corporate veil is that the corporation as a whole is a
“sham” or “façade,” a finding akin to fraud is necessary.”189 This view that fraud is not a
necessary element to pierce the corporate veil, except in situations where the corporation
is alleged to be a sham, façade, or the alter ego of the defendant, is probably the most
common position taken amongst the courts.190 Most courts only consider fraud to be a
factor in the overall determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil.191 According to
Cox and Hazen, fraud is not necessarily required to pierce the corporate veil as long as
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“[t]he facts presented…demonstrate some misuse of the corporate privilege or establish a
need to limit it in order to do justice.”192
e. The Instrumentality Doctrine193:
When a court finds that an individual treats a corporation “as an instrumentality
through which he conduct[s] personal business,” the corporate entity will be disregarded
and liability will be extended to the owner.194 A corporation is found to be a “mere
instrumentality” of the shareholder/s when a court finds that it has no independent reason
for its existence but to carry out the owner’s agenda.195 The instrumentality doctrine
requires proof of three elements: (1) “control, not mere majority or complete stock
control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice
in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had
at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;” (2) the “control must have
been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of
plaintiff's legal rights;” and (3) the “control and breach of duty must proximately cause
the injury or unjust loss” of the plaintiff.196
Of course, all corporations are used in some way as business instrumentalities.197
The scope of the question here must be whether the harm done by the owner’s “control
and domination” would make separation of the owner and corporation inequitable.198
According to Pinto and Branson, “[t]here must be such domination of finances, policies
and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or
existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its principal.”199 Instrumentality
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theories are most commonly used in the case of a parent corporation’s liability for the
torts and contracts of its subsidiaries.200
Perhaps the leading case extending liability to the owner of a corporation for his
use of the entity as a “mere instrumentality” is Zaist v. Olson.201 In Zaist, Martin Olson
was the owner of a number of corporations involved in real estate development. John
Zaist and others (Zaist) supplied services and materials to East Haven Homes, Inc. (East
Haven), one of Olson’s corporations. Proof was established that Olson freely used the
services and materials provided to East Haven with his other corporations in the
construction of a shopping center. East Haven subsequently became defunct and could
not compensate Zaist for the unpaid balance of $21,100. Zaist sought to pierce the
corporate veil and hold Olson personally liable for the debt, claiming that East Haven
was an instrumentality of Olson. The court held that Olson, and another corporation
under his control, so completely controlled East Haven that it had “no separate mind, will
or existence of its own.”202 The court extended liability to Olson holding that when a
“corporation is so manipulated by an individual or another corporate entity as to become
a mere puppet or tool for the manipulator, justice may require the courts to disregard the
corporate fiction and impose liability on the real actor.”203
Another prominent case extending liability under the instrumentality theory is
OTR Associates v. IBC Services, Inc.204 In OTR Associates, IBC Services, Inc. (IBC), a
subsidiary of Blimpie International, Inc. (Blimpie), rented a space in a shopping mall
owned by OTR Associates (OTR). IBC was created for the sole purpose of holding the
lease and had no assets, employees, or business premises of its own.205 Samyrna, Inc.
(Samyrna) subsequently entered into an agreement with Blimpie to sublease the space
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from IBC as a Blimpie franchisee. Samyrna defaulted on the rent to IBC, who in turn,
defaulted on the rent to OTR. OTR then sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold
Blimpie responsible for the unpaid rent. OTR argued that IBC was the mere
instrumentality of Blimpie through Blimpie’s “[d]omination and control” of “IBC to
commit a fraud or injustice” by avoiding to compensate OTR for the unpaid rent.206 The
court agreed that IBC was a mere instrumentality of Blimpie holding that when “the
parent so dominate[s] the subsidiary that it ha[s] no separate existence,” liability may be
extended to the parent corporation.207
Cases extending liability under the instrumentality doctrine almost always contain
one or more of the main factors of consideration for veil piercing discussed earlier.208
Determining that a corporation is nothing but a “mere instrumentality,” acting with “no
separate mind, will or existence of its own,” is somewhat of a conclusory finding.209 It is
not especially useful for purposes of deciding whether the corporate veil should be
pierced. Instead, it is “used as a matter of emphasis or posturing by litigants and courts,”
rather than as an independent basis for piercing the corporate veil.210 Nonetheless, courts
do consider “mere instrumentality” as an independent factor to consider in determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil.211
IV. Conclusion:
Clearly the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a “befuddled” area of law.
The lack of any definite rules and the heavy reliance on the specific facts of each case
make it difficult to generalize as to the factors that will lead a court to disregard the
corporate entity.212 Courts will require considerably more than a simple presentation of
abuses or manipulations on the part of the corporate owner/s. There must be a strong
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factual basis demonstrating that the abuses or manipulations actually took place before
the court will extend liability to the shareholders.213
Determining between proper corporate use and abuse is a difficult task. Many of
these issues fall within a gray area of legality. While a corporate entity is disregarded for
one purpose, it may not necessarily be disregarded for other purposes.214 It is clear,
however, that courts are much more likely to extend liability to either a parent
corporation or to shareholders of a close corporation, as opposed to shareholders of a
publicly traded company, for whom courts virtually never pierce the corporate veil. Not
every factor will be present in each case. The decision to pierce the corporate veil must
rest on a number of such factors.215 However, the more factors that are present, the more
probable it is that a court will pierce the corporate veil and hold its shareholders jointly
and severally liable on those unsatisfied debts.216
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separate and independent are observed.”); For a more extensive list of factors see Associated Vendors, Inc.
v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (1st Dist. 1962).
41

Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 1991), (“As for determining
whether a corporation is so controlled by another to justify disregarding their separate identities, the Illinois
cases focus on four factors: (1) the failure to maintain adequate corporate records or to comply with
corporate formalities, (2) the commingling of funds or assets, (3) undercapitalization, and (4) one
corporation treating the assets of another corporation as its own.”); Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 895
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (“Generally, courts cannot disregard the corporate entity unless the corporation has
been employed to defraud existing creditors, circumvent a statute, evade an existing obligation, protect
crimes or perpetrate a monopoly.”); Norris Chem. Co. v. Ingram, 679 P.2d 567, 570 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984) (“Where corporate formalities are substantially observed, initial financing reasonably adequate, and
the corporation not formed to evade an existing obligation or a statute or to cheat or to defraud, even a
controlling shareholder enjoys limited liability.”) citing H. Henn, Law of Corporations, § 146 at 253-254.
42

H. Henn, Law of Corporations, § 146 at 253-254 (Westlaw Publishers, 1970); Also see Henn and
Alexander, infra note 159, at 353 “[C]ourts have conditioned recognition of corporateness on compliance
with two requirements: (a) Business must be conducted on a corporate and not a personal basis; (b) The
enterprise must be established on an adequate financial basis.”).

43

James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Cox & Hazen on Corporations, at 275 (2d Ed. Aspen).

34

44

Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:1, page 1-7 citing U.S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142
F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).

45

See Robert Clark, Corporate Law, 37-38 (Little, Brown 1986); See Robert Clark, The Duties of the
Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1977) citing as authority Zaist v. Olsen, 154
Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (1967) (“The instrumentality rule requires, in any case but an express agency,
proof of three elements: control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; that
such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of
a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of plaintiff's legal
rights; and that the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of.”).
46

Clark, supra note 45, Corporate Law at 37.

47

Id.

48

Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:2, page 1-9. Presser also points to an interesting article on the
competing theoretical approaches to limited liability which consistently evolve and disagree about the
piercing doctrine thus preventing any attempt by scholars to crystallize the piercing doctrine. See Ribstein,
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80 (1991); See M. Wormster, Disregard
of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporation Problems 37-38 (New York: Baker, Voorhis and Co.
1927) (“In my judgment [it] is not only impossible but preposterous [that the rules as to when the corporate
veil could be pierced ought to be codified]. Human life and relations in regard to corporate development are
far too complex to permit of any such formulation. The law is a growth and must not be shackled.
Corporate law, in particular, develops so rapidly that such a formation would be stale even before the date
of its publication.”).

49

Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354, 116 S. Ct. 862 (1996) (“Piercing the veil is not itself an
independent…cause of action, but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of
action.”); Casini v. Graustein, 307 B.R. 800, 811 (Bankr. N.J. 2004) (“Before invoking the doctrine [of
piercing the corporate veil], a plaintiff must first establish an independent basis to hold the corporation
liable.”).
50

Casini v. Graustein, supra note 49, at 811 (“Having established corporate liability for a tort or breach of
contract, if the corporate defendant has insufficient assets to satisfy a prospective judgment, the plaintiff
may then seek to pierce the veil.”).
51

Id.

52

Thompson, supra note 7, at 1048.

53

Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 177 W. Va. 343, 346 (W.Va. 1986) citing David H. Barber, Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 17 Williamette L. Rev. 371, 373 (1981) (“Given the purpose of promoting commerce by
providing limited liability for shareholders in state corporation laws, courts have been reluctant to pierce
the corporate veil, even when the express purpose of incorporation was to limit the liability of the
incorporators.”).
54

Thompson, supra note 7, at 1068.

55

See David C. Cummings, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 441, 450
(1967).
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56

Thompson, supra note 7, at 1068-69.

57

Id. at 1069.
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Id.
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Id.

60

Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:1, page 1-8 (Piercing the corporate veil “is a doctrine applied by
courts in an extremely discretionary manner, in accordance with the individual consciences of the
judges.”); See Thompson, supra note 7.

61

Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 3 §3:5, page 3-56, points to this case which takes a very rigorous
attitude toward piercing the corporate veil: Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 15211523 (3d Cir. 1994), judgment aff’d, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (“[T]he corporate veil is pierced only
when the corporation was an article and a sham to execute illegitimate purposes and [an] abuse of the
corporate fiction and immunity that it carries.” “Not every disregard of corporate formalities or failure to
maintain corporate records justifies piercing the corporate veil…[piercing the corporate veil] is available
only if it is shown that a corporation’s affairs and personnel were manipulated to such an extent that it
became nothing more than a sham used to disguise the alter ego’s use of its assets for his own benefit in
fraud of its creditors.”); Industrias Magromer Cueros Y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs, 293 F.3d 912, 920
(5th Cir. 2002) (“Under Louisiana law, only exceptional circumstances warrant the radical remedy of
piercing the corporate veil.”); Gurry v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 406 Mass. 615, 550 N.E.2d 127, 133
(Mass. 1990) (“Massachusetts law is clear that the corporate veil should only rarely be pierced to prevent
“gross inequity…”).
62

See Henn, supra note 42; Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718, 721 (Fla.1963) (“Florida
jurisprudence indicates a reluctance to "pierce the corporate veil" unless disregard of the corporate entity is
necessary to prevent injustice.”); McDarren v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 1995 WL 214482
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“It is well settled that the New York courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil…”);
U.S. v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit of Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (“under New
York law, courts must be extremely reluctant to pierce the corporate veil…”); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc.,
supra note 22, at 683 (“This power to pierce the corporate veil…is to be exercised ‘reluctantly’ and
‘cautiously’ and the burden of establishing a basis for the disregard of the corporate fiction rests on the
party asserting such claim.”).
63

See Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:1, page 1-7 citing Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations, 14 Cal. L. Rev., at 15 (1925) (“[T]he jurisprudence of veil-piercing is a ‘legal quagmire’.”).

64

DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“The conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may
not…rest on a single factor…but must involve a number of such factors.”); See generally, Thompson, supra
note 7; Clark v. B.H. Holland Co., 852 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("The conclusion to disregard
the corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single factor, whether under-capitalization, disregard of
corporation's formalities, or whatnot, but must involve a number of such factors; in addition, it must present
an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.") citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 684.
65

DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“The conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may
not…rest on a single factor…but must involve a number of such factors…[I]n addition, [there must be]
present an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.”); Clark v. B.H. Holland Co., Inc., 852 F. Supp.
1268, 1276 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (“It is not the presence or absence of any particular factor that is
determinative. Rather, it is a combination of factors, which, taken together with an element of injustice or
abuse of corporate privilege, suggests that the corporate entity attacked had ‘no separate mind, will or
existence of its own’ and was therefore the ‘mere instrumentality or tool’ of the dominant [shareholder].”).

36

66

Id. supra note 7, at 1065-69; See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“undercapitalization,
coupled with disregard of corporate formalities…”); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), affirmed, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A] failure to observe corporate formalities
coupled with inadequate capitalization has frequently been cited as a basis for disregarding the corporate
entity…”).
67

Clark, supra note 45, Corporate Law at 88; However, see Thompson, supra note 7, at 1067
(“[U]ndercapitalization is not among the factors most frequently cited by the courts in piercing the veil, nor
is it among the factors associated with the greatest likelihood of piercing. The relative infrequency with
which courts cite undercapitalization in tort-related piercing cases suggests it is an issue that appeals to
commentators for reasons other than its predictive significance.”).

68

Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 177 W. Va. 343, 351 (W.Va. 1986) (“The obligation to provide adequate
capital begins with incorporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter during the corporation's
operations. With respect to determining the adequacy of the corporation's capital, in light of the nature and
magnitude of the corporate undertaking, there are several tests and factors which can be utilized to analyze
the financial data of the corporation. The capitalization of the corporation in question could be compared
with the average industry-wide ratios obtained from published sources. These average ratios could be
buttressed by expert testimony from certified public accountants, securities analysts, investment counselors
or other qualified financial analysts. Grossly inadequate capitalization for the purpose of piercing the
corporate veil would generally be reflected by a substantial deficiency of capital compared with that level
of capitalization deemed adequate in the case by the financial analyst experts.”) citing DeWitt Truck
Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686 (4th Cir. 1976). Also citing Barber, Piercing
the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 392-94 (1981) (“Grossly inadequate capitalization” for the
purpose of piercing the corporate veil would generally be reflected by a substantial deficiency of capital
compared with that level of capitalization deemed adequate in the case by the financial analyst experts).
69

U.S. v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (D. Del. 1988) judgment aff’d, 879 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.
1989) (“[T]he obligation to provide sufficient capitalization is an ongoing one, which begins at the time of
incorporation and continues throughout the corporation’s existence…”); Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., supra
note 57, at 351; J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 223 Neb. 493, 499 (Neb. 1986) (“Inadequate
capitalization means capitalization very small in relation to the nature of the business of the corporation and
the risks the business necessarily entails. Inadequate capitalization is measured at the time of formation. A
corporation that is adequately capitalized when formed but has suffered losses is not undercapitalized.
Undercapitalization presents a question of fact that turns on the nature of the business of the particular
corporation. The general rule is that inadequate capitalization is a factor to be considered in determining
whether to disregard the corporate entity.”) citing J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir.
1980); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 21, at 685-686 (“[T]he obligation to provide adequate capital
begins with incorporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter…during the corporation’s operations.”)
citing Gillespie, Dix, Adequate Risk Capital, 52 NW. U. L. Rev. 478, 494 (1958).
70

H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations, 303 (rev. ed. 1946).

71

Id.; A “transitional period of time” meaning at least from incorporation until the corporation becomes
profitable (or should become profitable if it becomes profitable at all). Robert Clark in Corporate Law,
supra note 42, page 90, suggests that once a corporation is set-up, failure to replenish the capital is not an
adequate reason to pierce the corporate veil. Clark states “there is no affirmative duty on [the shareholders’]
part to supply an additional investment to a dying corporation. Such a duty would be in fundamental
contradiction to the policy of permitting limited liability.”
72

Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138, 142 (S.D. 1990) (“…questions relating to individual shareholder
liability resulting from corporate undercapitalization should not be reached until the primary question of
corporate liability is determined.”).
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Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 1 §1:9, page 1-51 (““The basic idea behind the “undercapitalization” or
“inadequate capitalization” theory is that if the shareholder or shareholders deliberately incorporate with
initial capital they know to be inadequate to meet the expected liabilities of the business they intend to be
doing, they are engaging in an abuse of the corporate form, and ought to be individually liable when those
liabilities actually occur.”).

74

Ballantine, supra note 70, at 303.

75

Black’s Law Dictionary 164 (7th ed. 2000) (Capital – “Money or assets invested, or available for
investment, in a business.”).
76

Pinto & Branson, Understanding Corporate Law, 45 (Bender & Co., Inc. 2004); See Doyle v. Hoyle,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, 4 (D.N.H. 1995) (“Inadequate capitalization means capitalization very small
in relation to the nature of the business of the corporation and the risks the business necessarily entails. In
regard to that amount of capital that constitutes sufficient capitalization, the following standard
emphasizing economic viability rather than an inflexible computation of minimal capitalization should be
used: a corporation is undercapitalized when there is an obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the
nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking.”).
77

Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 45. Pinto & Branson point out that all owner contributions, including
equity and loans, are considered capital.

78

If a corporation procures adequate insurance, this will make a finding of undercapitalization less likely,
even if the insurer later goes bankrupt. See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 45, who cite to Radaszweski
v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1992) (“This distinction [between capital and insurance coverage]
escapes us. The whole purpose of asking whether a subsidiary [or other corporation] is "properly
capitalized," is precisely to determine its "financial responsibility." If the subsidiary is financially
responsible, whether by means of insurance or otherwise, the policy behind the [case law] is met. Insurance
meets this policy just as well, perhaps even better, than a healthy balance sheet.”).
79

Id.
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Professor Arthur R. Pinto is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in New York; Professor Douglas
M. Branson is a professor of business law at the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania.
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Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 46.
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Id.; See Ballantine, supra note 70.
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Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 46.
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Id.
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Id.

86

Id.

87

Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1961) (Justice Taynor lists three separate grounds for
invoking the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in the opinion: “The equitable owners of a
corporation…are personally liable when they treat the assets of the corporation as their own and add or
withdraw capital from the corporation at will; when they hold themselves out as being personally liable for
the debts of the corporation; or when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the
conduct of corporate affairs.”); Slottow v. American Casualty Co., 1 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Under
California law, inadequate capitalization of a subsidiary may alone be a basis for holding the parent
corporation liable for acts of the subsidiary.”).
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88

Id.

89

Id. at 475. See note 74.

90

Id. at 475 (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that there was no attempt to provide adequate capitalization.
Seminole never had any substantial assets. It leased the pool that it operated, and the lease was forfeited for
failure to pay the rent. Its capital was ‘trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of
loss…’.”).
91

Clark, infra note 92.

92

See Robert Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505, n.10 (1977)
(“It should be noted that, at least in recent years, inadequate capitalization per se does not trigger veil
piercing in California, and the courts apply the principles [set forth in the leading ‘inadequate
capitalization’ cases] in a fairly strict fashion.”) citing Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc. 84 Cal. App. 3d
982 (4th Dist. 1978), and U.S. v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hospital and Rehabilitation Center,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 685 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1982) as the authoritative ‘inadequate
capitalization’ cases in California; See Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital,
43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 885 (1982) (“[N]o decision has been found which squarely and unambiguously
announces a per se rule” that grossly inadequate capitalization alone will support piercing the corporate
veil.); However, the Slottow case, supra note 74, seems to contradict these Californian cases, but has
received negative analysis from other courts; J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 223 Neb. 493, 499
(Neb. 1986) (“Inadequate capitalization, by itself, is insufficient to prove fraud.”).
93

Id.; J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1980) (“Inadequate capitalization is a factor
for consideration in determining whether to disregard the corporate entity.”); Pinto & Branson, supra note
76, at 47, point out that Judge Easterbrook stated in Secon Service System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust
Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[W]e are unaware of any decision relying on undercapitalization
alone as grounds for disregarding the corporate entity in a contract case.”).
94

See Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 483 (Wis. 1988) (“In order for the corporate veil to be
pierced, in addition to undercapitalization, additional evidence of failure to follow corporate formalities or
other evidence of pervasive control must be shown.”); Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39-40 (Ga. 1991)
(“The Supreme Court of Georgia holds that for undercapitalization of a corporation to justify piercing the
corporate veil, it must be coupled with evidence of an intent at the time of the capitalization to improperly
avoid future debts of the corporation.”); Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th
Cir. 1991) (“A corporate entity will be disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when two
requirements are met: First, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual or other corporation no longer exist; and second,
circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a
fraud or promote injustice.”) citing Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chemical and Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1985).
95

See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343, 348 (1947).
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Id.
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Id.
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Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414 (N.Y. 1966).
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Id. at 422.

100

Id. at 419.
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101

See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d 714 (N.Y. 1968) holding that Walkovszky’s amended complaint
was sufficient and his case was able to be continued.
102

Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995).

103

Id. at 1459 (“Courts have generally declined to find alter ego liability based on a parent corporation's use
of a cash management system.”) citing In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F.
Supp. 22, 34 (D. Mass. 1987) (Without “considerably more,” “a centralized cash management system . . .
where the accounting records always reflect the indebtedness of one entity to another, is not the equivalent
of intermingling funds” and is insufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form.); United States v.
Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 132 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (cash management system indicative of the “usual parentsubsidiary relationship”); Japan Petrol., 456 F. Supp. at 846 (finding that segregation of subsidiary's
accounts within parent's cash management system was “a function of administrative convenience and
economy, rather than a manifestation of control”); See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48.
104

See supra note 80.

105

Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48.

106

Id.

107

See supra note 103.

108

Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991) (“When nothing is invested in the
corporation, the corporation provides no limited liability protection to its owner. Nothing in, nothing out,
no protection.”).

109

Id.; See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538 (9th
Cir. 1988); See Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837
(1982).

110

Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991).

111

Id. at 213.

112

Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48.

113

Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941).

114

Id. at 502; See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 48-49 for their analysis of Arnold v. Phillips.

115

Id. at 502-503; Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 49.

116

Clark, supra note 45, Corporate Law at 90.

117

See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 22, at 687 (“It is thus clear that corporate formalities, even
rudimentary formalities, were not observed by the defendant…”); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey
Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[C]orporate formalities [were] not
followed…”).
118

Id.

119

All these examples can be found in the case of DeWitt Truck Brothers, Inc., supra note 22: (“[T]he
corporation never had a stockholders’ meeting.” at 687); (“At the times involved here [the defendant]

40

owned approximately 90 percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock, according to his own testimony,
though this was not verified by any stock records. [The defendant] was obscure on who the other
stockholders were and how much stock these other stockholders owned, giving at different times
conflicting statements as to who owned stock and how much.” at 687); (“[I]ssued [stock] for a
consideration of one dollar [per share].” at 687); (“[The defendant] was receiving from $15,000 to $25,000
each year from a corporation, which, during most of the time, was showing no profit and apparently had no
working capital.” at 687); (There was no record that any director or officer had “received any fee or
reimbursement of expenses or salary of any kind from the corporation…” at 687); (“[N]o corporate records
of a real directors’ meeting in all the years of the corporation’s existence…” at 687); See Mackey v. Burke,
751 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1984); See Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); See Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
120

Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 43.

121

Id.

122

House of Koscot Development Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972).

123

Id. at 66.
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Id. at 67.

125

DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).

126

See Presser, supra note 4, at Chapter 3 §3:6, p. 3-70.

127

DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 125, at 687.

128

Presser, supra note 4, at 3-79; DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 125, at 687.

129

See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 44, where they discuss their belief that the lack of corporate
formalities alone may not be enough to warrant piercing the veil; Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 287
(D.C. 1975) (“While disregard of corporate formalities is a circumstance to be considered, it is generally
held to be insufficient in itself, without some other facts, to support a piercing of the corporate veil.”);
Clark v. B.H. Holland Co., 852 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("The conclusion to disregard the
corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single factor, whether under-capitalization, disregard of
corporation's formalities, or whatnot, but must involve a number of such factors; in addition, it must present
an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.") citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., 540 F.2d at 684;
Clark is followed in Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Vanderbilt Indust. Contracting Corp., 833 F. Supp. 37
(W.D.N.C. 1995); Cox & Hazen, infra note 163, at 283 (“Disregard of corporate formalities…does not
appear sufficient by itself to pierce the corporate veil,” citing Solomon v. Western Hills Dev. Co., 312
N.W.2d 428, 434 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
130

See Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 43-44, citing MBCA Close Corporation Supplement § 25.

131

Id.

132

Tannahill v. Aunspach, 538 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).

133

Scott Graphics, Inc. v. Mahaney, 549 P.2d 623 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).

134

Id. at 627 (“There was disregard of corporate formality in the operation of this corporation and there was
considerable ignorance on the part of the directors and officers as to its operation. These things in and of
themselves are not enough to warrant disregarding the corporate entity. However, should mismanagement
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occur for fraudulent purposes or result in injustice, then the corporate entity will be disregarded. We find no
evidence of fraud or injustice here.”).
135

Clark, supra note 45, at 85.

136

This example is exemplified in the DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. case, supra note 125.

137

See In re Haugen Constr. Services, Inc., 104 B.R. 1013 (D.N.D. 1989) for an example of this.

138

Clark, supra note 45, at 85; also see DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 64.

139

Clark, supra note 45, at 85; Solomon v. Betras Plastics, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
(“A failure to follow corporate formalities (i.e., properly issuing stock or keeping records) is not, by itself, a
sufficient ground upon which to base individual shareholder liability. This is because a loss is normally not
caused by the failure to follow corporate formalities.”) citing Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1950); Eagle
v. Benefield-Chappell, Inc., 476 So.2d 716, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Cox & Hazen, infra note 160, at 283;
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990).
140

See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., supra note 124, for an example of this. In DeWitt, there were no
corporate records of directors’ or stockholders’ meetings held by Fruit Co. However, this caused no direct
injury to DeWitt. Yet, it was still considered a factor in determining whether corporate formalities had been
followed to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil.
141

See Scott v. McKay, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7221 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[F]ailure to comply with corporate
formalities is no longer a factor in considering whether alter ego exists.”) citing Hinkle v. Adams, 74
S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
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Id.
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Id.

144

See Robert Hamilton, The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell at 90 (5th ed.; St. Paul: West 2000).
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Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991).
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See supra note 80.

147

Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 42.

148

Id.

149

See Flynn v. Greg Anthony Constr. Co., 95 Fed. Appx. 726 (6th Cir. 2003) for examples of intertwined
activities.

150

Pinto & Branson, supra note 76, at 43.
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American Trading and Production Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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